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Chapter 7
Proprietary Norms in Corporate Law:
An Essay on Reading Gambotto
in the United States

Deborah A DeMottt
It is a truism that national economies are extensively linked in the late twentieth
century. Capital markets, in particular, transcend national boundaries; among developed
economies, funds for investment move quickly and in vast amounts. One might be
tempted as a result to anticipate an inevitable convergence among nations ofthe legal
norms that underly capital investment. Corporate law, in particular, seems a likely
candidate for convergence because it defmes the corporate enterprise and the relationship
between investors and managers. It also specifies the legal protection accorded to
investors' expectations. Convergence in the corporate law context is a natural-feeling
thesis for proponents of a Hegelian thesis of historical evolution, 2 as well as for the
efficiency-oriented proponents of the economic analysis oflegal rules and institutions. 3
The High Court's opinion in Gambotto v WCP Ltef is a development that confounds
robust visions of impending convergence among corporate law regimes. By treating a
shareholder's interest as proprietary, the Gambotto court impeded transactions that
eliminate the equity investment of minority shareholders. By comparison, corporate
law in the United States, and particularly in Delaware, facilitates such transactions,
commonly (and not always pejoratively) known as "freezeouts." Additionally, in the
United States, a freeze out transaction would utilize substantially different statutory
mechanisms, and litigation challenging the transaction would be structured differently
from the Gambotto litigation.
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Professor of Law, Duke University.
See eg, Francis Fukuyama, The End ofHistory and the Last Man (1992) (convergence thesis ofevolution
in political structures toward liberal democracy).
The standard account is one of competition among states for corporate charters, focusing on statutes. See
Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law (1993). In the United States, Delaware
dominates as the situs of incorporation for public companies. Although they differ in some respects,
state corporation statutes are relatively uniform. Other states mimic Delaware, and it adopts innovations
introduced elsewhere to maintain its lead. See generally Michael Klausner, "Corporations, Corporate
Laws and Networks of Contracts" (1995) 81 Virginia LRev 757 n 283.
(1995) 182 CLR432; 127 ALR417; 16 ACSR 1; 13 ACLC 243.
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Reading Gambotto is a startling experience for a United States lawyer, not because
the case illustrates differences in fonnal statutory mechanics, but because the nonnative
bases for the majority judgment diverge dramatically from assumptions prevailing in
the United States. Additionally, United States lawyers would be startled by the fact
that Mr Gambotto represented himself in the lawsuit and by his resilience as a pro se
litigant, given the duration of the lawsuit and the relatively small value of his investment.
In this chapter I describe initially how a Gambotto-like transaction would as a fonnal
matter be structured under United States corporation statutes and how challenges to
the transaction would proceed. I then examine the larger comparative interest of the
case: it illustrates the profound significance to practical outcomes of underlying
assumptions about the nature of corporate law structures and equity investment. In
United States corporate law, property-based ideas do not have as dominant a place in
defming the nature of shareholding as the High Court accords them in Gambotto.

Statutory Mechanisms to Eliminate Minority Shareholders
The dispute in Gamhotto
Industrial Equity Limited ("IEL") owned 99.7% of the issued shares ofWCP Ltd,
all but 50,590 of WCP's shares. IEL detennined that eliminating the minority
shareholding in WCPwould be a tax-efficient move. It anticipated selling WCP's land
holdings at a gain, then offsetting the taxes due with otherwise unusable tax losses
realized elsewhere in the IEL group of companies. IEL was unable to eliminate WCP's
minority shareholders through statutory provisions that explicitly pennit compulsory
acquisition of minority shares by a majority shareholder, due to the provisions' high
approval thresholds;s the provisions require the acquisition to be approved by 90% in
nominal value and 75% in number of minority shares. The dissentient shareholders in
Gambotto held 15,898 shares out of the 50,590 not held by IEL. To eliminate the
minority thus required either a voluntary sale of the dissentients' shares or an alternate
statutory mechanism with less onerous voting requirements to compel the disposition
of all minority shares. The alternate mechanism of choice was an amendment to WCP's
articles.
The amendment proposed by WCP' s directors would have conferred on a shareholder
entitled to 90% or more of WCP's shares, the right to acquire compulsorily all of
WCP's issued shares at a price of $1.80 per share. Under the Corporations Law,
altering or amending articles requires a special resolution adopted at a shareholder
meeting. 6 The vote required is a majority vote based on a quorum of at least 75% of
shareholders entitled to vote. 7 Prior to the shareholder meeting, WCP shareholders
received an expert's report valuing the shares at $1.365, a valuation the dissentient
shareholders conceded to be independent and fair. All shareholders present at the
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Corporations Law ss 414(5)(b) and 701 (2)(c)(ii).
Ibids 176(1).
Ibid s 253(1)(b).
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meeting voted in favor ofthe amendment (the dissentients did not appear personally or
by proxy). The dissentient shareholders challenged the amendment as oppressive and
beyond the statutory power to amend articles. A majority of the High Court agreed,
reversing the New South Wales Court of Appeal. s
The High Court majority held that the power to amend a corporation's articles
could be used to eliminate a shareholder only when that shareholder's continuing
ownership would be detrimental to the corporation. The opinion gives two specific
examples of detriment. A freezeout would be justifiable when a shareholder competes
with the corporation or when necessary for the corporation's continuing compliance
with a regulatory requirement applicable to its principal business that, for example,
concerns shareholders' nationality. In contrast, the majority explicitly disapproved of
freezeouts that would enable the corporation to pursue a new commercial advantage.
The majority reasoned that the proprietary nature of shareholding is inconsistent with
any less onerous standard for expropriation, and allocated the burden of establishing
validity to the majority shareholder. Additionally, reasoned the majority opinion, to
permit the use of amendments to articles to eliminate minority shareholders would
circumvent "the protection which the Corporations Law gives to minorities who resist
compromises, amalgamations and reconstructions, schemes of arrangement and takeover
offers."9
Justice McHugh's separate opinion, like the majority opinion, assigns to the majority
shareholder the burden of establishing that the amendment was not oppressive. The
relevant standard, however, should be whether the freeze out "will enable the company
to pursue some significant goal, or to protect itself from some action that is external to
the company."IO This standard is broader than that adopted by the majority opinion
because it would permit a freeze out that enables the corporation to pursue an opportunity
otherwise foreclosed to it. Justice McHugh's opinion expressly approves as a legitimate
business objective the realization of significant tax savings. But, the opinion concludes,
proponents of the WCP transaction failed to prove that it was not oppressive, that is,
that the price was fair, the minority shareholders were dealt with fairly and "a full
disclosure of all matters in relation to the alteration and expropriation has been made."ll

Freezeouts in the United States
A transaction like that attempted in Gambotto would usually be structured as a
merger in the United States. Following a resolution from the subsidiary corporation's
directors, the majority shareholder would vote its shares to merge the corporation with
another corporation, most likely an existing wholly-owned subsidiary ofthe majority
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shareholder or a new subsidiary created solely for use in the merger. 12 The resolution
would specify the consideration to be received by minority shareholders in exchange
for their shares. If the majority shareholder holds a very large proportion ofthe stock
- 90% under the Delaware statute and the Revised Model Business Corporation Act the directors' adoption of a plan of merger suffices and it is not necessary to obtain a
shareholder vote on the merger. 13 Shareholders who dissent from the transaction have
the right, following ajudicial appraisal proceeding, to receive in cash the value oftheir
shares as of the time of the merger. 14
Corporation statutes in the United States do not contain counterparts to the statutory
oppression remedy. IS A shareholder challenging the propriety of a freezeout would,
instead, argue that the transaction breached the majority shareholder's fiduciary duty to
the minority. 16 The general proposition that a majority shareholder should be treated as
a fiduciary toward the minority is long- and well-established in US case law . This principle
is not understood to make it improper for the majority to exercise its voting power.
Cases applying the principle to the specific context of freezeout mergers fall into two
groups. First, since 1983, the Delaware standard has been that the majority must establish
the "entire fairness" ofthe transaction by establishing fair price and fair dealing; Delaware
caselaw does not require any showing as to the purpose of the transactionY Second,
courts in several other states - like Justice McHugh's opinion in Gambotto - additionally
require a showing that the transaction had a bona fide business purpose. IS Delaware
12 See eg, Del Code Ann, tit 8, s 251 ; Rev Model Business Corp Act ss 11.01 and 11.03 . Under these
statutes, a simple majority of outstanding shares suffices to approve a merger, in the absence of
complications created by division of shareholders into distinct classes or voting groups. A statutory
share exchange is an alternate structure under the Revised Model Business Corporation Act. See ibid s
11 .02. Merger and share exchange statutes do not require that the transaction be approved by a majority
of minority shareholders.
13 See Del Code Ann, tit 8, s 253; Rev Model Business Corporation Act s 11 .04.
14 See Del Code Ann, tit 8, s 262, Rev Model Business Corporation Act ss 13.01-13.03; 13 .20-13.28;
13.30-13.31.
15 The closest comparison is with statutory provisions that treat oppression as a basis for involuntary
dissolution in a petition brought by a shareholder. See eg, RMBCA s 14.30(2)(ii). In about half of the
states, a buyout of the complainant's holdings is an alternative remedy. Some states limit the buyout
remedy to closely-held corporations. See F Hodge O'Neal and Robert B Thompson, 0 'Neal's Oppression
ofMinority Shareholders, ss 7.13 and 7.19 (2d ed, 1991).
16 In some states, appraisal is by statute the shareholder's sole and exclusive remedy following a merger.
These statutory provisions vary, and some (but not all) courts have recognized exceptions for outright
fraud. See Victor Brudney and William W Bratton, Brudney and Chirelstein 's Corporate Finance 79798 (4th ed, 1993).
17 Weinberger v UOP, Inc 457 A2d 701 (Del 1983).
18 See Perl v UI Int'l Corp, 607 P 2d 1036, 1046 (Hawaii 1980) (merger effected for sole purpose of
freezing out minority is breach of majority shareholder's fiduciary duty); Coggins v New England Patriots
Football Club, Inc, 397 Mass 527, 492 NE 2d 1112 (1986) (controlling shareholder has burden of
showing that freeze-out furthered a business purpose); Berkowitz v Power/Mate Corp, 135 NJ Super 36,
342 A 2d 566 (1975) (enjoining transaction when majority shareholder did not establish business purpose
for transaction or faimess of price to minority); Alpert v 28 Williams Street Corp, 63 NY2d 557,473 NE
2d 19 (1984) (in freeze-out merger, removal of minority will be justified when related to advancement of
a general corporate interest).
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cases required a showing of business purpose from 1977 19 through Weinberger v UOP,
Inc, decided in 1983. The Weinberger court jettisoned the business purpose requirement
on the basis that it provided no additional meaningful protection to minority shareholders,
given the entire fairness test, the operation of the appraisal remedy, and the court's
"broad discretion ...to fashion such relief as the facts of a given case may dictate ... "2o
Delaware cases apply the entire fairness test to directors' decisions that are not
protected by the business judgment rule from judicial scrutiny of the merits of the
decision. The business judgment rule would, for example, be inapplicable to a decision
made by self-interested directors 21 or to a decision made by directors who were
insufficiently informed prior to making the decision. 22 Weinberger applied the test to a
cash out merger because the directors of the subsidiary corporation were dual (and
conflicted) fiduciaries, who owed fiduciary duties to the minority shareholders as well
as the majority.23 The operative content of entire fairness varies somewhat with the
type of transaction at issue. If, for example, a parent corporation has benefitted at the
expense ofthe subsidiary in dealings between them, the entire fairness standard requires
the parent to disgorge the benefit. 24
As detailed in Weinberger, in the freezeout context the standard encompasses separate
but ultimately related aspects of fair dealing and fair price. An inquiry into fair dealing
implicates questions about the timing, structuring, negotiation and disclosure of the
transaction. Fair price under Weinberger includes all "elements that affect the intrinsic
or inherent value of a company's stock" and is equivalent to the general appraisal
remedy.2s Although Weinberger and its progeny do not dictate any particular defmition
for "intrinsic or inherent value" that would specify a division of anticipated gains between
majority and minority shareholders, Weinberger permits introduction of evidence of
elements of future value known or susceptible of proof as ofthe date of the merger. 26
Although the differences among US jurisdictions are significant, their magnitude
seems puny once one reads the majority opinion in Gambotto. The Gambotto majority
explicitly imposed a substantive hurdle for freezeouts that differs from the business
purpose test and ranges well beyond the entire fairness standard in Weinberger.
Additionally, the potential reach of the reasoning in Gambotto is open to question in
several respects, some of them interrelated. The principle adopted by the majority in
Gambotto is, on its face, broadly applicable and would reach actions that are not
See Singer v Magnavox Co, 380 A 2d 969 (Del 1977).
457 A 2d 701 at 715.
See eg, Gottlieb v Heyden Chemical Corp, 91 A 2d 57, 57-58 (Del 1952).
See eg, Smith v Van Gorkom, 488 A 2d 858, 893 (Del 1985).
457 A 2d at 71 O. Weinberger contains a dictum strongly encouraging the use of an independent committee
comprised of the subsidiary's outside directors; the use of such a committee is "strong evidence that the
transaction meets the test offaimess." Ibid at 709 n 7. See also Gambotto at 446 (leaving open whether
majority must refrain from voting).
24 See eg, Sinclair Oil Corp v Levien, 280 A 2d 717, 720 (Del 1971).
25 457 A 2d at 710.
26 Ibid at 713 .
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preliminary to expropriations of minority interests. Gambotto emphasizes the
"proprietary nature" of a share, characterising a share as more than a capitalized stream
of dividends. Gambotto would thus be implicated by an unconsented-to alteration of
any non-economic prerogative conferred by the share that can be characterized as a
proprietary right. Alteration to voting rights would be an obvious example. It is an
open question, to say the least, whether Gambotto applies to alterations that treat all
shares equally, or whether the case should be read as applicable only to transactions
that are uniquely advantageous to the majority shareholder.
On the freezeout front, a pressing question is Gambotto 's applicability to freezeout
transactions effected other than through an amendment to articles. The Corporations
Law contains provisions permitting binding compromises or arrangements between a
corporation and its members, subject to approval from 75% of the nominal value of the
shares present and voting and to judicial approval. 27 The court may condition its approval
on "such alterations or conditions as it thinks juSt."28 As it happens, the leading
Australian treatise suggests that this statutory mechanism could be used to effect a
"conversion of preference shares to debentures,"29 that is, to compel an exchange of
equity securities for debt. The Gambotto majority does not fully address the
circumstances under which a minority shareholder may be bound by a compromise or
arrangement that eliminates the shareholder's equity investment. A passage in the
opinion quoted earlier notes the statutory protection afforded minorities who resist
schemes of arrangement (and other transactions). One might read this passage to
exempt schemes from the operation of the Gambotto principle, on the basis that the
protective statutory structure supersedes the consequences of the shares' proprietary
nature. But the statutory standard for judicial approval of a scheme is whether it is
"just", and it would be unsurprising were Gambotto to frame or influence operative
conceptions of justice.
Relatedly, the Gambotto majority disapproves of the use of the alteration of articles
mechanism to circumvent the protective features of other mechanisms in the statute.
Interdependence of statutory provisions is the unarticulated premise supporting this
point. It is not evident how broad a doctrine of interdependence the majority have
adopted. Alternatively, a court could accord independent operation or equal dignity to
each formally distinct mechanism created by the same statute. 30 As it happens, US
courts disagree on this question. Delaware and states following its lead usually apply
an equal dignity doctrine, permitting (for example) the elimination of accrued dividends
on preferred stock through a merger although the statute prohibits achieving the same
27 Corporations Law s 411(4)(a)(ii).
28 Ibids41l(6).
29 See H A J Ford, R P Austin and I M Ramsay, Ford's Principles o/Corporations Law (1995) para
24.010.
30 As did Meagher, J A, writing for the Court of Appeal in Gambol/o. See [1993] 30 NSWLR at 389
(various provisions in Corporations Law do not "constitute some sort of code governing the expropriation
of shares").
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end through an amendment to the corporation's charter. 31 Courts in other states have,
at least in specific contexts, rejected the equal dignity doctrine; the best-known case,
Faris v Glen Alden Corp recharacterizes as a merger a transaction formally structured
as a purchase of assets, and thereby confers voting and appraisal rights on the shareholders
of the purchaser. 32 While some degree of tension between form and substance in
corporate law is inevitable,33 the majority opinion in Gambotto is striking because it
resolves the tension through a potentially unbounded, albeit unarticulated, anti-formalist
stance.
Australian commentators on the practical effect of Gambotto predict an increase in
greenmail transactions, that is, in individually-negotiated transactions in minority shares
at prices or on terms not available to other minority shareholders. 34 In general, majority
shareholders may fmd it attractive to acquire the minority's shares through voluntary
transactions that do not implicate the sundry statutory mechanisms, varying the purchase
price when necessary.
Australian corporations could in theory foreclose greenmail threats by adopting
articles amendments that prohibit the payment of greenmail, as did many US corporations
in the 1980' s. Suppose, however that a shareholder dissents from the amendment and
argues that, if effective, the amendment would constitute oppression under the reasoning
in Gambotto. The dissentient shareholder would, as a result of the amendment, lose the
ability to obtain an individually-negotiated sale of his shares, an arguably proprietary
feature of share ownership. One response would be that an anti-greenmail amendment
satisfies the criteria for legitimacy specified in Gambotto. Foreclosing an avenue to
extract greenmail forecloses a prospective detriment, in this instance not a detriment to
the corporation' s current commercial operation, but to the nongreenmailers among
minority shareholders. The theory of detriment is that each dollar extra paid to the
greenmailer is a dollar less available to pay to all other minority shareholders. On the
other hand, ifthe shares in question are viewed solely as the dissentient shareholder's
individual property, demanding a higher price for them does not seem inappropriate.
Moreover, Gambotto may require a more immediate detriment than this example
suggests.

Gam botto 's reasoning suggests an analogy to real estate development. A real estate
developer may offer to buy a group of adjoining parcels for the same price per acre. It
is not unusual, nor is it morally or legally objectionable, for any individual owner to
hold out for a higher price. If the developer pays the higher price, moreover, it does
31 See Federal United Corp v Havender, 11 A 2d 331 (Del Ch 1940); Bove v Community Hotel Corp, 105
RI 36, 249 A 2d 89 (1969).
32 143 A 2d 25 (pa 1958).
33 Indeed, Delaware cases overall are not consistent. Some recharacterize transactions on the basis of
economic substance while others decline to do so. See generally Ronald J Gilson and Bernard S Black,
The Law and Finance ojCorporate Acquisitions (2d ed, 1995) at 682.
34 See Saul Fridman, "Gambotto v WCP: No Definitive Statement on Issue" Australian Financial Review,
March 13, 1995 .
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not necessarily pay a lower price to all other property owners. The developer may
simply be spending a larger amount on land acquisition which, other things being equal,
would make the project less profitable for the developer. It remains to be seen whether
Gambotto implies a comparably atomistic view of members' proprietary interests. By
characterizing the dissentients' shareholding as a proprietary interest, the Gambotto
majority pretermitted any reason to consider the legitimacy of any particular shareholder's
reasons for refusing to sell at a given price. To the extent the real estate analogy
underlies Gambotto's reasoning, the principle in the case applies regardless of whether
the proposed transaction treats all members equally.

Proprietary Norms
Gambotto demonstrates the power oftheory in corporate law disputes: as the case
illustrates, how we think about the nature of shareholding has major practical
consequences. The preceding comparison with US corporate law might prompt the
conclusion that its treatment of shareholders is free of intellectual artifacts derived from
property. To be sure, members' rights to remain as such are, as we have seen, readily
defeasible in the United States under standards much less exacting than those adopted
by the majority in Gambotto. All the same, notable features of the US corporate law
landscape are explicable only by reference to concepts derived from property norms.
In characterizing the forms of legally-protected entitlements, legal theorists
conventionally distinguish between property rules and liability rules. 3s For our immediate
purposes, the key difference is that under a property rule the holder of an entitlement
has a veto over any proposed transfer of the entitlement, whereas under a liability rule
a nonentitled party may purchase the entitlement at a price set by a court. This abstract
distinction applies neatly to the treatment of freezeout transactions in Delaware law
contrasted with Gambotto. Delaware applies a liability rule to freezeouts. Subject to
establishing that the transaction was entirely fair to the minority if it is challenged by a
shareholder, the majority has the right to compel the minority to sell at a price set by
directors elected by the majority, the price in turn always open to judicial scrutiny
through the appraisal remedy.36 Gambotto, in contrast, applies a property rule, subject
to one modification: each shareholder has an absolute veto over the sale of his shares,
unless the majority establishes his continuing ownership itselfto be detrimental.
Aspects of corporate law resist complete capture by this simple dichotomy, however.
Consider the implications of the court's authority under Weinberger to fashion such
relief as the facts of a given case dictate, when a controlling shareholder has not acted
with entire fairness. Weinberger explicitly permits the court to award rescissory damages,
35 See Guido Calabresi and A Douglas Melamed, "Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral" (1972) 85 Harv L Rev 1089.
36 Appraisal provisions in US corporation statutes are far from uniform in applicability and operation. For
a comprehensive evaluation, see Hideki Kanda and Saul Levmore, "The Appraisal Remedy and the
Goals of Corporate Law" (1985) 32 UCLA L Rev 429.
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noting that the appraisal remedy - which gives the shareholder the fair value of his
shares as of the time of the merger - may be inadequate in circumstances including
"fraud, misrepresentation, self-dealing, deliberate waste of corporate assets, or gross
and palpable overreaching ... "37 Rescissory damages are, in monetary form, a proprietary
remedy, a substitute for return of property in kind. In the absence of some proprietary
element in shareholding, the robust presence of this remedy in shareholder litigation
would be difficult to explain. Even if the remedy is characterized as an unusual form of
liability rule, its justification derives from a property-based conception of the initial
entitlement. Nor is the presence ofrescissory relief adequately explained by the objective
of deterring specified forms of conduct. Punitive or exemplary damages more directly
serve a deterrent function, yet are distinct from rescissory damages.
The proprietary character of some aspects of corporate law is likewise evident in
the Delaware Supreme Court's most controversial recent case, Cede & Co v Technicolor,
Inc. 38 In Cede, the court held that proof of injury was not an element of a shareholder's
cause of action for directors' breach of their duty of care. 39 Technicolor's directors
approved an arms-length merger of the corporation without conducting an auction or
structuring an effective post-agreement market check to legitimate the negotiated price.
The directors' decision to approve the merger fell outside the protection of the business
judgment rule because it was not adequately informed. As a consequence, the directors
had the burden of establishing the entire fairness ofthe merger. In an appraisal action
tried first by the Court of Chancery, the court determined that the merger price was fair.
The supreme court reversed the lower court's reliance on a "no harm, no foul principle";
the supreme court also emphasized that under the entire fairness standard applicable to
the dispute - the plaintiff having rebutted the presumptions of the business judgment
rule - ultimate recovery would not be limited to the difference between the merger price
and value as determined by appraisal because it might well include elements of rescissory
damages.
The outcome in Cede is baffling if the shareholder's entitlement to duly informed
service from directors is treated exclusively as a form ofliability rule, one that resembles
entitlements created by tort law. The directors' breach deprived the shareholders of
that entitlement, but through the resulting merger the shareholders received a price at
least equal to the appraised value of their stock, as determined by a court. If the
shareholders' entitlement is, in contrast, treated as a form of property rule, the merger
is the consequence of an unconsented-to transfer or taking, and the shareholders are
presumptively entitled to the return of their shares. Translated into monetary relief,
shareholders should receive an amount equal to the current value of the shares, an
37 457 A 2d at 714 (1983).
38 634 A 2d 345 (Del 1993). The purchaser in Cede sold Technicolor six years after the merger for $750
million, having paid $125 million through the merger. The plaintiff in Cede sought to recover $40
million. The suit named as defendants Technicolor's directors at the time of the merger, plus the purchaser
and its controlling shareholder. See generally Karen Donovan, "Delaware Court Hears Takeover Case
Third Time", National Law Journal, June 5,1995, atBl.
39 Ibid at 371.
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entitlement that gives shareholders the benefit of post-merger appreciation in value.
The availability to shareholders of a proprietary remedy is, nonetheless, significantly
different from the form of shareholders' entitlement under Gambotto. Rescissory
damages become available under Weinberger only when the majority has acted
wrongfully. If the majority deals fairly, although the appraisal remedy may result in
dissenting shareholders receiving more than the merger price, the majority shareholder
has no general duty to account for benefit it realizes through the freeze out. Indeed, in
its latest opinion in the Cede litigation, the Delaware Supreme Court affIrmed the Court
of Chancery's determination on remand that the transaction was entirely fair to
Technicolor's shareholders. 40 The Supreme Court emphasized that liability is not
automatic under the entire fairness standard; analysis under the standard requires the
trial court to examine and balance "the nature of the duty or duties the board breached
vis-a-vis the manner in which the board properly discharged its other fiduciary duties. "41
In contrast, under Gambotto, each minority shareholder has an absolute veto over the
sale of his shares. The presumptive value to any or all minority shareholders of their
veto power is the gain the majority shareholder anticipates through the freezeout. On
the Gambotto facts, the benchmark amount would be the value of the projected tax
savings. Generalised, the legal principle in Gambotto is distributively more favorable
to minority shareholders than the Weinberger approach.42
Distributional consequences are not the end of the story, however. The history of
corporate law in the United States illustrates that legal rules have consequences for
business effIciency. Two points in the evolutionary line are salient. Well into the
nineteenth century in the United States, any fundamental corporate change required
shareholders' unanimous consent; any shareholder could block the corporation's
consolidation with another corporation, and could also block a major purchase or sale
of assetsY As the century progressed, "[i]t became increasingly apparent to observers
that great benefits to society, to the corporation, and derivatively to the rest of the
shareholders were sometimes blocked to protect interests that seemed quite minor or
even venal to the remaining shareholders and perhaps to most outsiders."44 This era led
40 Cinerama. Inc v Technicolor. Inc., 1995 WL 431434 (Del, July 17, 1995).
41 Ibid. The Supreme Court's opinion does not specify respective weights to be assigned in the balance, nor
does it articulate categorical restrictions on the availability of rescissory damages. The Court of Chancery's
opinion, in dicta, observes that rescissory damages may be an appropriate remedy against a director
when the director has breached the fiduciary duty of loyalty but that such damages should never be
awarded when the director has breached only the duty of care. The underlying principle limits the
availability of rescission or a substitute for it to one who participates in a transaction as a principal or is
a co-conspirator of a principal or "has a material conflict of interest of another sort." See Cinerama. Inc
v Technicolor. Inc, 1994 WL 568654 (Del Ch, October 6, 1994).
42 Entitlement forms that give the in-kind holder more control over transfer are, in general, more distributively
favorable to in-kind holders than are liability rules. See Madeline Morris, "The Structure of Entitlements"
(1993) 78 Cornell L Rev 822 at 854.
43 See William J Camey, "Fundamental Corporate Changes, Minority Shareholders, and Business Purposes"
[1980] Am Bar Found Res J 69 at 80.
44 Ibid at 81.
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to general corporation legislation that facilitated mergers by majority shareholder vote
and created appraisal rights. Merger legislation itself evolved significantly in the twentieth
century, with changes that permitted the distribution to shareholders of consideration
other than shares of the surviving corporation, and, in particular, the distribution of
cash. 45 Courts in tum legitimated the use of these statutes to eliminate minority
shareholders. 46 Later cases like Weinberger regulate freezeout tactics. This history,
from its start to present, encapsulates a shift from a property rule to a liability rule,
driven (if one credits the historians) by legislative and judicial concern for business
efficiency.

Conclusion
Many factors might help explain the relative primacy that Gambotto accords to a
proprietary conception of shareholding. For starters, in the Australian context, arguments
grounded in efficiency concerns may be less compelling, as applied to freezeouts, than
in the United States. The Australian universe of public companies and securities trading
is much smaller than its counterpart in the United States. Justice McHugh's opinion in
Gambotto notes that price volatility in the Australian market is noticeable and not
necessarily the product of rationally explicable factors.47 As a result, observers of the
Australian market, and of corporate transactions more generally, may perceive a
disjunction between activity dominated by securities markets and underlying business
enterprise. Freezeouts, moreover, often follow in the wake of takeovers and other
larger transactions in corporate control; freezeouts' social utility may be in question in
an environment skeptical about the broader social value of stock markets and takeover
activity.
Relatedly, Australians who make direct investments in domestic equities have many
fewer choices than do their counterparts in the United States. 48 After a freezeout,
opportunities to reinvest, at least in domestic equities, are more limited in Australia. A
shareholder's identity as a member of a company, not merely as a provider of equity
investment, is likely stronger in a world that appears to afford fewer investment choices.
This appearance is a bit illusory, however, ifnondomestic equity investments, or pooled
45 See Gilson and Black, supra n 33 at 1253-54.
46 See eg, Stauffer v Standard Brands. Inc, 187 A 2d 78 (Del Ch 1962).
47 (1995) 182 CLR 432 at 458. Debates over the significance of volatility in US securities markets focus on
whether volatility increased in the 1980's, when the transactions costs of trading became lower. Volatility
statistics for the 1980's look very different depending on one's treatment of the October 1987 crash.
After the 1987 crash, volatility returned to pre-1975 levels. See Paul G Mahoney, "Is There a Cure for
'Excessive' Trading" (1995) 81 Virginia L Rev 713 at 730-31. Average volatility data for the Australian
stock market illustrate that it is the least volatile market in the Asia-Pacific region. See Australian Stock
Exchange, Market Report 1994 at 12.
48 The US securities market is enormous. The New York Stock Exchange -listing venue for most large US
corporations - in 1994 listed 2,510 companies, including 204 non-US listings. New York Stock Exchange,
Fact Bookfor the Year 1994, at 8. Total US equities outstanding had an estimated value ofUS$6.1351
trillion in the third quarter of 1994. Ibid at 83. As of June 1994, total capitalization on the Australian
market was A$287.6 billion. See Australian Stock Exchange, Market Report 1994 at II .
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investment vehicles, are readily available choices.
A further explanation may lie in differences between the structure and approach of
corporate law in the two countries. The formal qualities of corporate law in Australia
are markedly different from corporate legislation in the United States. The Corporations
Law does not include provisions that authorize merger transactions and, as Gambotto
notes, the statutory treatment of compulsory acquisitions requires a high degree of
assent from the minority. On several points, the Corporations Law is more complex
and contains much more mandatory prescription than counterpart legislation in the
United States. 49 In contrast, requirements for extensive periodic disclosure of information
have long been a feature of federal securities regulation in the United States but are
relatively recent in Australia. An information-rich environment may engender greater
confidence in the integrity of corporate decisionmakers because greater visibility
legitimates their decisions. so In contrast, in a legal universe where so much is specified
by statute in great detail, the omitted - like freezeouts - may presumptively be prohibited.
Comparative law scholarship is ill-suited to prescriptive conclusions. We do well to
understand the differences between legal norms in different systems and do very well
indeed if we can explain their origins. It is no criticism of the majority's approach in
Gambotto that it differs profoundly in many respects from norms of corporate law that
prevail in the United States. The question warranting further inquiry is the fit between
Gambotto and the objectives and presuppositions of corporate law in Australia.

49 Examples include the statutory treatment of share repurchases and takeover bids.
50 Freezeouts are subject to specific disclosure requirements under federal securities regulation when they
have the effect of eliminating public shareholders in a public company. The relevant SEC rule does not
regulate the purpose or pricing of the transaction. It does, however, require the company's directors to
state whether they believe the transaction to be fair or unfair to minority shareholders and to discuss the
factors on which such beliefis based. SEC Rule l3e-3, Schedule l3E-3, item 8. Counterpart regulation
in Canada, issued by the Ontario Securities Commission, imposes substantive requirements for minority
approval and valuation. See Ontario Securities Commission, Policy Statement 9.1. Further discussion
of the regulation offreezeouts in Canada is contained in Chapter 9.

